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1. On the Renaissance of Citizenship 
Since the 1980s, the term citizenship has again come into common usage. It is a term 
employed in debates over the concept of social rights and social citizenship in the context of 
the transformation of welfare states. It is also used, in the wake of immigration, in public and 
academic debates over access to full membership for immigrants in countries of immigration 
(and emigration) by parentage, birthright or naturalization. The concept of citizenship 
travelled from the Anglo-Saxon debate into German-speaking countries where it encountered 
the older term “Staatsangehörigkeit” (nationality), which defines the legal dimension of state 
membership. Although the term citizenship is frequently translated as “nationality,” it makes 
more sense to broaden the latter term to citizenship, as concepts of membership beyond the 
state in the narrower sense have also gained significance, as in the case of citizenship of the 
European Union (EU). 
 The two examples of the welfare state and migration referenced above reflect the 
challenges facing relations between citizens and the state on the one hand, and relations 
among citizens on the other. With the transformation of welfare states questions arise such 
as whether the conditionalization of claims might impair the principle of equal social rights for 
all citizens. The initial challenge to state citizenship arising from international migration is the 
exclusion of non-members. Citizenship guarantees by law and by obligation the inclusion of 
full members (citizens) in varied functional relationships such as the labour market, education 
or politics. Such a duality of social closure by way of inclusion and exclusion could at best be 
eliminated by the existence of world citizenship. The presence of non-citizens, moreover, 
questions the necessary congruence between territory, the state constituency (electorate) 
and state authority. It also raises the interesting question of whether and to what extent an 
imagined cultural homogeneity of state citizens is an indispensible requirement for the 
allocation and guarantee of rights and obligations, reciprocity and solidarity. 
 In Germany as in other liberal democratic societies, three major developments have 
been observed over the past few decades. They indicate the gradual transformation or 
shapeshifting of citizenship. First, there is a tendency toward the expansion of nation-state 
citizenship, as expressed for instance in easier access to (state) citizenship for resident 
migrants. The second development is the public debate over erosion, for example the 
dismantling of social rights and a greater emphasis on the personal contributions of full 
members. The third development is the emergence of different forms of genuine citizenship 
beyond the nation-state, primarily transnational citizenship as in dual or multiple (state) 
citizenship, and supranational citizenship as in the EU. All these developments indicate that 
the borders of (state) citizenship as an instrument of social closure are gradually shifting, 
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creating new lines of differentiation among citizens and between citizens and non-citizens. 
New rules of citizenship redress inequalities but also produce new ones. In effect, it is no 
longer possible to distinguish clearly between “within” and “without,” between “us” and “the 
others.” In sum, citizenship in Germany has undergone a gradual but fundamental 
transformation which is inadequately described by a movement from “blood” to “soil”. It is 
rather a transformation which points into at least three different directions. 
 
2. Dimensions of Citizenship 
Citizenship – that is the demand that all citizens have equal rights – is essentially a contest-
ed, normative concept (Walzer 1989). In the Aristotelian tradition of political thought, citizen-
ship constitutes an expression of full membership in a politically constituted community and 
indicates that citizens are both the rulers and are ruled. It is important to distinguish between 
the legal and political dimensions of citizenship. In the legal sense it refers to affiliation to, or 
membership in, a state. The principle of “domaine reservé” obtains here inasmuch as states 
have the sovereign right to decide over full membership. An important criterion of interna-
tional law is thereby the principle of a genuine link, meaning that a person must maintain 
sustained ties to the state or states in question. These principles are set down in the German 
Basic Law, specifically Article 16 and Article 116 para. 1. Even when Germany was divided, 
the Federal Republic of Germany recognized only one German nationality, the consequence 
being the inclusion of citizens of the German Democratic Republic over and above their own 
state citizenship (1967-1990). Legally, at least three means of acquiring German citizenship 
are distinguished: (1) Eligibility through parentage, i.e. children acquire the citizenship of their 
parents (jus sanguinis)—a principle that obtains in practically all states of the world. (2) In 
many states it is also possible to acquire citizenship if the individual is born within the state 
territory (jus soli)—an option that was introduced in Germany in 2000. This principle is of par-
ticular relevance to the children of migrants. (3) There is also the possibility of acquiring citi-
zenship through naturalization. In this case, criteria such as length of legal residence, com-
mand of the pertinent language and economic pre-requisites apply (jus domicilii). The gen-
eral conditions for acquiring German citizenship were laid down in the “Reich and Nationality 
Act of 1913 (RuStAG),” which underwent a comprehensive reform in 2000 and was renamed 
the “Nationality Act (StAG)”. 
(State) citizenship is an eminently political concept, founded on the idea that in a de-
mocracy citizens, and not subjects, are the constitutive agents. In the modern sense, citizen-
ship only came into being with the emergence of republican thought after the French Revolu-
tion. Since then, the state has been understood not in territorial terms state or as the person-
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al domain of an absolutist monarch, but as an association of citizens. As a political concept, 
state citizenship comprises three interconnected dimensions. First, democratic legitimation is 
created through equal political freedom. Second, citizenship comprises equal rights and obli-
gations for all full members. These include, in T. H. Marshall’s (1964) classic triad, civil rights 
under the rule of law, democratic political rights, and social rights in a welfare state; these 
have been extended—highly contentiously—to include cultural rights for persons and/or 
groups such as national minorities, indigenous groups, and immigrants (cf. Kymlicka 1995). 
Obligations comprise, for instance, tax liability and, in some countries, compulsory military 
service.  
A third component of citizenship is affiliation. It concerns the buttressing of the politi-
cal and legal dimensions through expressive and moral components articulated, for example, 
through feelings of belonging to a collectivity such as a nation, and which are consequently a 
major resource for trust-building among citizens. This trust is demonstrated through reciproci-
ty (as in, for instance, inter-generational retirement pension contracts) and solidarity. This 
third dimension in particular highlights the fact that citizenship is not solely based on relations 
between states and citizens, but that relations among citizens are decisive for guaranteeing 
equal political liberties, rights and obligations. This brings us to the question how the collec-
tivity relates to minorities. The concept of “constitutional patriotism” as formulated by Dolf 
Sternberger plays a role here (Habermas 1992). According to this concept, it is not the ma-
jority culture in a pluralistic society that is the main frame of reference, but rather the univer-
salist principles of human rights and the rule of law, which also protect minorities. In this 
view, constitutional patriotism substitutes for nationalism as the focus of collective identity. 
 
3. Three Strands of Development: Expansion, Erosion and Extension 
Three main trends in the development of citizenship can be identified which have contributed 
to shapeshifting citizenship over the past century. These are: expansion—through the con-
tinual inclusion of new groups within (nation) states; erosion—through the decreasing politi-
cal participation of members/citizens in the public sphere; and extension—through the partial 
separation of the triad of state authority, state population and state territory and the overall 
trans-nationalization of social processes.  
Expansion: De-ethnicization and Diversity 
The expansion of (state) citizenship can be explained from two viewpoints, namely 
progressive inclusion and a conflict approach. An example of progressive inclusion of 
previously excluded groups is the reform of the German Citizenship Law, which came into 
force in 2001. The new legislation, which implements a jus soli principle, includes the 
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children of foreign parents born in Germany in the eligibility framework for German 
citizenship if at least one parent has lived legally in Germany for at least six years. Up until 
the early nineteenth century, the birthright principle applied in German states. The first 
nationality laws, introduced, for example, in Prussia in 1842, adopted jus sanguinis 
(parentage,) as the governing principle for acquiring nationality. With the introduction of the 
Reich and Nationality Act (or RuStAG) of 1913, jus sanguinus was the sole principle of 
eligibility. With the reform of citizenship legislation in 2000 the birthright principle was 
extended to include second-generation immigrants. 
An explanation for the relatively restrictive approach to naturalization in Germany 
compared to that of many neighbouring countries in western Europe is the tremendous 
influence that the notion of nationhood—and in particular the notion of republican or ethnic 
nationhood—had on German citizenship legislation until quite recently. In this perspective, 
“state-nations” like France exhibit a republican understanding of nationhood that gives rise to 
more inclusive citizenship regulations, while “cultural nations” like Germany, on account of 
their ethnic understanding of the nation, are much more restrictive (Brubaker 1992: 182). 
From a republican perspective, an individual’s affiliation to a state is above all a question of 
subjective will and their readiness to belong to and identify with the state and the nation, 
while according to an ethno-cultural understanding state affiliation is objectively determined 
by membership by descent in an ethnic, cultural and linguistic community. Access to (state) 
citizenship in ethno-culturally defined nation-states is thus frequently determined by ethnic 
background and cultural propinquity and therefore constitutes an exception. In republican 
nation-states, however, access to citizenship is possible for all immigrants under similar, 
comparatively liberal conditions. The adoption of the RuStAG of 1913 in West Germany and 
the long period of restrictive conditions for naturalization, particularly with respect to working 
immigrants from the 1950s onward, is often explained in terms of  continuity of the ethnic or 
ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood in West Germany (cf. Gosewinkel 2001). 
A continuation of the ethnic notion of nationhood, however, cannot explain the intro-
duction of the birthright principle of eligibility for citizenship in the German Citizenship Act—a 
far-reaching, liberal piece of legislation compared to other European countries—which has 
been in force since 2001. In the parliamentary debates leading up to this legislation, all the 
parties in the political spectrum supported a republican concept of nationhood. The propo-
nents of liberalization argued that the integration of migrants required legal activation for 
them to make use of their citizenship rights, while the opponents of an extensive liberaliza-
tion regarded the acquisition of citizenship as the successful conclusion of an integration 
process. All the viewpoints reflected, moreover, a deep-seated conviction about societal in-
tegration. While liberalization sceptics, such as the Christian Democrats, emphasized the 
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importance of the principle of subsidiarity (the norm that it is the smallest unit that should 
take care of protection, such as the family, and thus, by implication, immigrants should prove 
that they are “integrated”), advocates of liberalization, such as the Social Democrats and the 
Greens, underscored the importance of the rights of individuals as the basis for successful 
social integration (Faist 2007).  
For the specific developments in post-war Germany and the fundamental reform of 
the StAG, political and in part legal factors were more important than the alleged continuity of 
an ethnic concept of nationhood. The political factors were several. For one thing, some as-
pects of the German concept of nationhood itself did not continue unbroken after World War 
II. A specific German understanding of nationalism, one aspect of the German “Sonderweg,” 
as it has often been called, was certainly a major factor, having led as it did to the cata-
strophic turmoil of National Socialism and the Holocaust. On the other hand, West Germa-
ny’s post-war orientation to the West and to Europe, its welfare-state integration, and West 
German society’s endeavours, triggered by the student movement in the 1960s and ’70s, to 
come to terms with the past, are factors of a magnitude that would at least raise questions 
about the continuation of an ethnic concept of nationhood (see, for example, Winkler 2000).  
A further aspect is that even the privileged treatment of ethnic German immigrants in 
accordance with Article 116 of the Basic Law, often cited as key evidence of a continued 
ethnic concept of German nationhood, is not just ethnically oriented. As is well known, the 
objective was also for the successor state of Nazi Germany to assume responsibility vis-à-vis 
ethnic Germans persecuted and expelled on account of Nazi crimes. After World War II the 
ethnic definition was thus not only an end in itself, but also a means of identifying individuals 
who were eligible for compensation for the injustice they had suffered. 
 In terms of the legal framework, the Basic Law in particular and the prominent role of 
constitutional jurisdiction in the German political system help explain the controversial char-
acter of German citizenship legislation and the delay in extensively reforming it. The adoption 
of the RuStAG of 1913 in association with Article 116 of the Basic Law after World War II 
exemplifies this argument. The measure served to uphold the prospect of German reunifica-
tion. In this respect it is no coincidence that political debate over a reform of citizenship legis-
lation did not intensify until after German reunification. How German law dealt with persons 
who, during the Nazi regime, had lost German citizenship for political, racial or religious rea-
sons—among them many Germans of Jewish descent—also does not fully support the thesis 
of ethnic nationhood after World War II. Based on Article 116, para 2, the law stipulated that 
persons denaturalized by the Nazi regime, as well as their children, could regain German 
citizenship by declaration, without the need to return to Germany. According to interpreta-
tions of this law, the legislators did not rescind denaturalization summarily so as not to force 
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German citizenship upon such persons (Mangoldt et al. 2010, Vol. 3, 1791-1852). Although 
this option was used by persons of Jewish descent denaturalized during the Nazi regime, 
reports by returning emigrants indicated the mistrust they experienced at the hands of the 
authorities and the public (Lehmann 1997). The option for renaturalization should also be 
considered in the context of reparations. With respect to the latter, the German government 
was more accommodating to persons of Jewish descent than to other groups who suffered 
persecution, such as Communists. 
The first reform measures in the liberalization of eligibility for German citizenship in 
the 1990s were followed by an increased rate of naturalization. With respect to the countries 
of origin of individuals applying for and acquiring citizenship, Turkish citizens constitute the 
largest category (with over 25 per cent; 2009), followed by Serbia and Montenegro (6 per 
cent), Iraq (5 per cent), Poland and Afghanistan (each  4 per cent), Iran and Morocco (3 per 
cent), and the Russian Federation, Romania and the Ukraine (each  around 2.5 per cent); 
naturalized citizens from other countries of origin make up over 40 per cent (Migration Report 
2009: 230). The high percentage of “others” is also an indication of the steadily increasing 
diversification of immigrants’ countries of origin. At the individual level, it is evident that as a 
rule a longer period of residence in Germany and an advanced knowledge of the language 
increases the likelihood of naturalization, reflected in rules which require a minimum period of 
residence and knowledge of the German language. It is noteworthy, moreover, that while the 
liberalization of eligibility criteria resulted in a higher naturalization rate, the category of the 
country of origin is at least as important. On average, naturalization figures are higher for 
immigrants from so-called developing countries and countries beset with political instability 
than for immigrants from other EU and OECD countries. One reason for this is that for 
immigrants from the former category there are practical advantages to having German 
citizenship, such as extensive freedom to travel, whereas no such advantages are gained by 
citizens from other EU member states.  
However, the extension of citizenship also brought about new ways of exclusion. For 
example, Germany and Turkey are states that are linked to each other through transnational 
social spaces and which react to each other’s membership policy changes. In the early 
1990s, arson attacks in the German towns of Mölln and Solingen killed eight Turkish women 
and girls. In the belief that Turkish immigrants in Germany would be fully protected only if 
they had German citizenship, the Turkish government reacted by changing its previous policy 
of discouraging naturalization in Germany. At the same time, Turkey wanted to strengthen its 
links to its largest expatriate community. In 1995, it introduced a ‘pink card’ that facilitated 
renunciation of Turkish citizenship by guaranteeing former Turkish citizens most of the rights 
they had previously enjoyed, though it did not provide for the franchise in Turkey. Turkish 
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migrants apparently did not trust the value of this external quasi-citizenship, and a substantial 
number of migrants renounced their Turkish citizenship only temporarily in order to become 
naturalized in Germany, but then reacquired it through the Turkish consulates. The Turkish 
authorities colluded, thus exploiting a legal loophole that, before 2000, had not permitted the 
German authorities to deprive German citizens of their nationality while they resided in Ger-
many.  
In 1999, the new red–green coalition government in Germany, made up of the Social 
Democratic Party and the Greens, promised to introduce reform to promote dual citizenship, 
but failed to implement this crucial element of its proposal. The new citizenship law that came 
into force in 2000 required applicants for naturalization to renounce their existing nationality. 
Shortly before the regional and federal elections in 2005, the German authorities deprived 
about 20,000 immigrants of Turkish origin of their German citizenship because they had re-
acquired Turkish nationality, arguing that they had violated the rules governing citizenship in 
Germany. This episode illustrates how states whose citizenship regimes have become en-
tangled in rather densely knotted transnational spaces may act independently to pursue their 
own political goals but still become exposed to the policy choices of the other. In the end, the 
German government, in the face of Turkish opposition, decided to uphold, in principle, the 
rather restrictive renunciation clause. This occurred not despite but perhaps because other 
citizenship rules were liberalized at the same time. 
The second strand explaining the expansion of citizenship in the twentieth century is 
rooted in a conflict-oriented paradigm and focuses on the demands of marginalized groups 
who press for access, summed up in the slogan “rights must be taken”. This approach 
emphasizes conflicts between (antagonistic) groups, e.g. workers vs. capitalists, as the 
driving force behind the expansion of inclusion. Social citizenship (Marshall 1964) serves as 
an important example. Ssocial citizenship in the German Reich originated in the late 
nineteenth century, when Bismarck introduced social legislation in response to the 
organization of trade unions and social democracy. It was expanded during the Weimar 
Republic to include unemployment insurance, and again after the founding of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to include retirement pensions and, later on, long-term care insurance. 
Compared to the civic and political components, social citizenship is much more 
controversial and is based on the concept that equal citizenship status is provided as a 
countermeasure to market-generated inequalities, thus, following T. H. Marshall, securing the 
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legitimacy of capitalism in democracies.1 It is precisely through the lens of social citizenship, 
for instance, that fault lines can be detected in the construct of “normal” employment 
(husband as full-time wage earner, wife relegated to household work and part-time work in 
labour markets), which guided German social policy for decades.  
These distinctions are increasingly controversial, particularly with regard to citizenship 
rights—for example, the dichotomy of public and private has been debated from a feminist 
perspective. The aim of “citizenization” from this point of view is to dismantle barriers that 
promote or cement hierarchies. Such boundaries are seen as socio-political constructions 
that require amendment. Changes that were achieved in this respect relate, for example, to 
household management. In the German Civil Code from 1900 the husband was declared to 
be in charge of the household. Since the reform of the matrimonial law in 1977, marriage 
partners are expected to take care of their household management by mutual agreement. 
The criticism of drawing boundaries under asymmetrical power relations seeks to expose the 
assumptions that lie behind a universalistic understanding of citizenship in terms of hetero-
geneities such as class, gender, language, age and sexual orientation. 
Multicultural citizenship explicitly takes into consideration the differences between in-
dividuals and guarantees minorities special rights in order to ensure their inclusion and, 
hence, the social cohesion of a state-constituted society. It is part of a human rights revolu-
tion observable all over the world since World War II. In Germany, the issue concerns above 
all partial rights to self-government, education and language for the “national minorities,” 
which are regionally concentrated: the Danes (near the border of Denmark in Schleswig-
Holstein), Sorbs (a Slavic minority in Saxony, close to the borders of Poland and the Czech 
Republic) and Frisians (at the North Sea coast and on contiguous islands), who make up 
around 0.25 per cent of the total population.  
According to German law, national minorities are those groups of citizens who are 
traditionally resident in Germany and who live in their traditional settlement areas, but who 
set themselves apart from the majority population by virtue of their own language, culture 
and history, and who wish to preserve their identity. In Germany, members of such minorities 
are thus only those people with their own citizenship who have been resident in Germany for 
a long time, a status that newly arrived groups (e.g. migrants) or historically non-sedentary 
groups, such as Roma cannot achieve or maintain. Multicultural rights for immigrants, such 
                                               
1
 For newer discussions on social citizenship beyond the national level, see the Social Protection Floor initiative 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the United Nations (UN); see 
http://www.socialsecurityextension.org/gimi/gess/ShowTheme.do?tid=1321 
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as exemption rights on the grounds of religious convictions, are very limited in Germany (cf. 
Kraus/Schönwälder 2006). Efforts are nevertheless being made by state and federal gov-
ernments to take cultural difference, especially on religious grounds, into consideration with 
respect to Muslim religious communities. Still, one can at best speak of collective citizenship, 
as inclusion in public life is granted, where appropriate, through corporatist public bodies, 
following the model of Christian churches, and not primarily through individual rights. 
International conventions constitute the starting point for inclusive citizenship. The implemen-
tation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and hence, for exam-
ple, the right of children with physical and learning disabilities to inclusion in mainstream ed-
ucation, is lagging behind (cf. Bielefeld 2009). Inclusion thereby denotes equal status without 
assuming “normality.” Normality is in fact diversity—the existence of manifold heterogenei-
ties. Inclusion refers to the societal institutions that create structures in which individuals with 
specific needs and abilities can participate. It has become apparent that “integration” is asso-
ciated with an attitude that societal institutions should only create the background conditions 
to which individuals are expected to adapt themselves—an approach that is meanwhile con-
troversial. 
Erosion: Restructuring the Welfare State and the Disappearance of the Labourer 
Two salient trends dominate the debate over the erosion of citizenship, namely the restruc-
turing of the welfare state and the frequent assertion that public spirit is in decline. In welfare 
state policies, social rights are increasingly supplemented or replaced with contractual ele-
ments such as, for example, “activation” policies in the labour market. Activation means that 
people’s human capital is supposed to be mobilized by public policies to enter into the formal 
labour market and find employment instead of allegedly drawing social assistance payments. 
Also, areas like education, which have for a long time been a central element of Anglo-Saxon 
welfare states, are gaining significance, and endeavours are being made to integrate work 
and family issues, as expressed in ‘the four Cs’: Children, Care, Careers, College education. 
Opinions are divided, however, on the extent to which the transformation to an activating 
welfare state amounts to a more forceful implementation of neo-liberal, i.e. market elements.2  
Activation policies turn classic concepts of social citizenship on their head (Lessenich 2008). 
                                               
2
 One may argue that a case of gradual erosion is the German public pension system in the face of demographic 
changes, as the proportion of contributors to the system is getting smaller whereas the proportion of beneficiaries 
(retired persons) is growing. Over the past two decades a perceptible shift has been occurring in that the contribu-
tors are encouraged to invest individually into capital savings schemes. On the long run this implies a shift away 
from intergenerational reciprocity to individual liability. 
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The approach to social rights in Marshall’s sense emphasizes that social citizenship, as a 
means of securing a living standard commensurate with economic, cultural and political de-
velopments, can only be effective if the appropriate institutionalizations are implemented and 
social rights, understood as “enabling rights,” establish the basis upon which political free-
dom can at all be claimed.  
As to migration across borders and social rights, a sea change has occurred for some 
of those who are usually labelled labour migrants (Faist 1997). There are two innovations, so 
to speak—contract workers3 and the self-employed. These instruments have contributed to 
an erosion of social rights. First, in the early 1990s contract workers came as part of service 
agreements between German general contractors and foreign subcontractors. At first, these 
agreements were embedded in treaties between Germany and countries in Middle and East-
ern Europe (MOE). It was akin to freedom of services within the European Union and the 
service agreements were meant as a pre-accession aid to MOE countries. In practice, the 
service provisions implied that subcontracting companies in the construction sector from 
MOE countries could bring their own labour to deliver the services in Germany. This labour 
was paid prevailing German wages but not the social wages. The latter were determined by 
the respective sending countries, making these companies competitive. The problem was not 
a substitution for “German” labour—reunification opened up many more opportunities for 
construction companies—but the extraterritorial status of labour from MOE countries in Ger-
many. Legally, these workers were not regarded as labour migrants as such but were con-
sidered as an appendage to the companies carrying out the contractual agreements, result-
ing in a re-commodification of migrant labour.  
The issue somewhat shifted when construction companies from Southern European 
Union member states entered the German market, bringing along labourers who were paid 
only wages and social wages according to sending country standards. This cost-cutting de-
vice was soon regulated by an EU directive so that labourers from other EU member states 
had to be paid wages prevailing in Germany. This led to yet another shift, however. More and 
more, labourers offer their services as self-employed workers and thus do not fall under the 
purview of labour law. Overall, while these changes cannot be labelled “social dumping”, they 
are a clear case of re-commodification of labour in a particularly interesting form: workers are 
                                               
3
 Contract workers, sometimes called posted workers, are sent abroad by their companies which are subcontract-
ed by German general contractors. Such workers, for example, did come to Germany as personnel of Polish 
subcontractors to carry out construction projects in Germany. 
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legally not considered labourers to be regulated by social and labour law but either as an 
annex to service providers or service providers themselves. 
Extension: Uncoupling of Rights and Collective Identities 
The extension of citizenship explicitly raises the question of the transformation of states and 
membership and is a prime case of shapeshifting. The essential question is whether the 
three dimensions of citizenship—equal political liberties, rights and obligations, and collective 
identities—can be uncoupled from one another. There are three positions on this. The first—
post-national—position is that citizenship can be conceived of and visualized beyond the 
nation-state. A simplified version of this extension would be that of an evolution of citizenship 
from cities like the Greek polis or medieval city states to national citizenship and, finally, 
cosmopolitan and world citizenship. A somewhat more complex approach is the claim that 
rights on the one hand and collective identity on the other hand are drifting apart. In the con-
text of the EU as a whole, and in the light of weakly developed social rights at the EU level, it 
could be said that rights on the one hand and welfare state solidarity on the other are dis-
connected. Not only is there an inflationary use of terms such as post-national citizenship, 
but there is also hardly any empirical evidence of an EU social citizenship in terms of welfare 
citizenship, with the exception of areas such as the transfer of social rights for EU citizens 
working abroad, health and safety at work and gender equality policies. A third opinion, 
which does not necessarily rule out the other two, draws attention to the fact that nation-
states are becoming transnationalized from within, i.e. citizenship continues to emanate pri-
marily from the nation-state, but is being restructured through the emergence of supranation-
al governance and its interaction with nation-state, regional and local levels (Faist 2001), as 
well as the implementation of human rights, but  also the influence of neo-liberal policies and 
securitization of immigration over the past decade (Faist 2003). 
There are two clear forms of citizenship beyond the nation-state: dual or multiple citi-
zenship in two or more nation-states, and nested citizenship within the EU. Dual citizenship 
illustrates the internal transformation of nation-states. While sixty years ago, dual citizenship 
was tolerated by hardly any state in the world, today well over half of all states accept some 
form of dual citizenship. Dual citizens profit mainly in terms of practicalities such as freedom 
to travel or the ability to buy property in another state. Up until the mid-twentieth century, the 
legal maxim held that every individual should have one nationality, but only one. This re-
quirement has become outdated, however. The main impetus behind this development 
turned out to be the enforcement of human rights beyond international conventions in the 
national legislation of democracies. This was crucial for the principle of gender equality. In 
Germany the rule requiring women marrying men of a different nationality to adopt automati-
cally their husband’s citizenship was abolished in the early 1970s.  
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A further motivation, in addition to human rights, was the requirement in democracies 
that the population and national constituency be essentially congruent—in the long term, 
incongruence would lead to the exclusion of certain categories of residents. While in contrast 
to the—by European standards—relatively liberal birthright principle, the regulations in Ger-
many on dual citizenship are still restrictive, there is a growing number of exceptions. For 
instance, individuals from countries that strictly refuse to revoke their citizenship (e.g. Iran, 
Morocco, Afghanistan) and individuals from EU states are not required to renounce their for-
mer citizenship in order to become naturalized Germans. In recent years these rules have 
resulted in a growing number of individuals applying for German citizenship without renounc-
ing their former citizenship; from 2000-2009, the figure was between 40 and 50 per cent of 
applicants (Migration Report 2009: 232). 
Thus, while dual citizenship entails transnational elements in citizens’ ties to more 
than one state, it still only applies to (individual) nation-states. Going further, citizenship be-
yond the nation-state can be interpreted on the basis of post-national models. The starting 
point for this perspective is that the citizen-foreigner duality has become obsolete. Human 
rights, it is argued, have in recent decades come closer to citizens’ rights inasmuch as states 
not only implement them, but also foster new statuses, for example, that of the resident citi-
zen (denizen). Resident citizens are non-naturalized migrants who theoretically have access 
to an almost complete range of social rights. In their case, there is a divergence of rights on 
the one hand and collective identity on the other (Soysal 1994), i.e. an uncoupling of the se-
cond and third dimensions of citizenship. In a post-national perspective Hannah Arendt’s 
(1951) dictum that ultimately only state citizenship can guarantee the enforcement of human 
rights would need to be qualified. The post-national claim is that liberal democratic nation-
states tend to adhere to human rights. With respect to the post-national position, it is disput-
ed whether international human rights regimes have had an influence on nation-states, or 
whether resident citizenship is not primarily a consequence of welfare state principles. Non-
citizens participate in (the German) social insurance scheme(s), for example, if they are le-
gally employed. Globally, more than 12 million stateless persons also attest to the claim that 
the post-national thesis is to be treated with care when going beyond the narrow band of 
liberal democratic states. 
Another example of citizenship beyond the nation-state that does not entail interna-
tional migration is EU citizenship. In this case, all citizens of EU member countries are simul-
taneously EU citizens; moreover, the European Court of Justice has drawn up a set of equal 
rights for all resident citizens, which, however, varies broadly across countries in terms of 
political and social citizenship. Post-national concepts of citizenship raise the general ques-
tion whether the double coding of citizenship—that is, trust, reciprocity and solidarity among 
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citizens as necessary to secure rights and obligations—is still effective when rights are de-
veloped at the supranational level, or whether the uncoupling of the three dimensions of citi-
zenship is already well underway.  
The multi-layered governance of EU citizenship, including European, national, re-
gional and local elements, can be seen as nested citizenship (Faist 2001). The EU layer is 
thin, however, whereas the national component of citizenship is strongly developed. This 
state of affairs is exemplified in social citizenship: the EU provides for only selected rights, 
such as portability of benefits acquired by EU citizens across borders, health and safety rules 
in the workplace and some rules applying to gender equality. Moreover, it is important to note 
in this connection that the EU is pressing ahead with the concept of civic citizenship which is 
compatible with a sort of market citizenship. This is an endeavour to define a core of rights 
for citizens of third countries permanently residing in the EU, so that they are treated in a 
manner comparable to citizens of EU member states, including the right of settlement, family 
reunification, access to the employment market and to social security, the right to vote at 
European parliamentary elections and the right not to be expelled. 
All issues concerning the extension of citizenship fundamentally involve the relation-
ship between human rights and civil rights, which in turn raises the major problem of the rela-
tionship between global justice and human rights on the one hand and justice within nation-
states on the other. There is no evidence of an alignment of human rights and civil rights, 
however. While human rights do seem to have had a greater influence on civil rights within 
the national framework, for instance regarding the growth of dual citizenship and emerging 
practices of multicultural citizenship, the validity of human rights is restricted within national 
borders and the borders of the EU. It is also questionable to what extent the category “hu-
man”, as opposed to “person” guarantees a legal capacity that makes effective protection 
possible (cf. Hegel 1979: 92-102). 
 
4. Outlook: “We” and the “Others” 
The above description of the expansion, erosion and extension of citizenship in Germany 
illustrates that conventional concepts of citizenship comprise a duality of inclusion and exclu-
sion. Through social closure mechanisms, categorizations such as “we” and “the others” are 
produced and reproduced. In a transnational perspective, state citizenship thereby contrib-
utes to the reproduction of social inequalities borne by accident of birth or geography. Con-
trary developments along the changing boundaries of (full) membership are also observable, 
however. On the one hand, the boundaries of citizenship have become more permeable, for 
instance through new institutions such as EU citizenship. Using nationalism as a foundation 
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for collective identity is, moreover, a contentious issue in Germany. Sceptics generally ques-
tion the future of national citizenship and point out that citizenship is being watered down. 
Because states are no longer reliant on their citizens as workers and soldiers to the same 
extent as they used to be, but increasingly depend rather on their economic power, they are 
less inclined to grant citizens full political and social citizenship (Fahrmeir 2007). On the other 
hand it is noticeable that states are tending to seal themselves off from within, for example, 
through national and supranational border controls, even before citizenship becomes acces-
sible. The past decades are thus a prime example of shapeshifting citizenship. 
Notwithstanding all this, it is doubtful whether a dichotomous perspective of “inside” 
and “outside” is able to capture the changes in citizenship. Through processes of transna-
tionalization within national societies the “other” is always one of “us”, as the constant pres-
ence of non-citizens testifies. And what is more, the publicly debated plurality has enlarged to 
include further heterogeneities such as gender, class, religion, lifestyle, and livelihood activi-
ties. It is thus of prime importance to understand the ever shifting shapes of the boundaries 
of citizenship. 
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